We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their predictions. This contrasts with well-known \chaos theorems," which suggest that majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space is multidimensional.
Introduction
McKelvey's celebrated theorems (1976, 1979) on the genericity of global cycles in majority voting are fundamental to our understanding of the potential outcomes of a social decision process. These results assert that if the set of social alternatives is a multidimensional Euclidean space, then under mild conditions on the pro le of voters' preferences, there is a nite chain of alternatives starting at any given x and ending in any other y such that each alternative in the chain is preferred by a majority of voters to its predecessor. These results are often interpreted to show that in multidimensional policy spaces majority voting is chaotic or unstable since no alternative appears to dominate the others.
The general conclusions drawn from this interpretation of McKelvey's Chaos Theorems 1 have led many people to believe that it is impossible to predict the nature of social decisionmaking without a detailed speci cation of social institutions and rules. For instance, Stiglitz (1988) writes, \If, however, there are a variety of dimensions-some individuals are liberal on some issues and conservative on others-then the median voter is not well de ned, and there may be no equilibrium to the political process." According to Persson and Tabellini (2000) , \By the mid-to late 1970s, theorists had clearly demonstrated that searching for a universally applicable theory of political equilibrium is a futile exercise. Further, majority voting would generically lead to cycles, unless the voting agenda was restricted... The outlook of many researchers at the time was thus quite pessimistic: any positive theory of political choicewhether it was based on majority voting or not -seemingly had to rely on unattractive or arbitrary assumptions." These beliefs have resulted in a growing body of literature that derives social equilibria conditional on explicit speci cations of the institutional structure. Without denying the importance of that direction of investigation, one is left with the impression that except in exceptional cases, very little can be said about social choice outcomes that is institution-free. This is problematic if the equilibrium outcomes are highly sensitive to the ne details of the institutional process. For instance, if the \institution" resembles a bargaining game, then the equilibrium outcome will typically depend on the speci c bargaining protocol. Therefore, it appears as if the unpredictability associated with the chaos theorems has been replaced by a predictability that may su er from a lack of robustness.
The approach adopted in this paper, following another of McKelvey's (1986) in uential papers, is to explore whether there are some predictions about majoritarian social choice outcomes that are \relatively" institution-free. More precisely, is it possible to bound the set of \stable social outcomes" in the sense that all social equilibria must lie within these bounds under a wide variety of di erent institutional arrangements? In this paper, we focus on two such sets: the Uncovered Set of Miller (1980) and the Banks Set (Banks (1985) ).
The two sets are arguably the most appropriate ones to bound the possible social outcomes. McKelvey (1986) demonstrated 2 that in any multidimensional setting where voters have quasi-concave preferences (the so-called spatial setting), the Uncovered Set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three di erent institutional frameworks : a two-candidate competition in a large electorate 3 , cooperative behavior in small committees, and sophisticated behavior in a legislative environment. Hence, in a strong sense the Uncovered Set is a useful generalization of the notion of a Condorcet winner. The Banks Set is less general than the Uncovered Set in that it only applies to a speci c institution. Nevertheless, that institution, voting by amendment agendas (also known as voting by successive elimination), is a very important one which is paradigmatic for most committee voting rules and is the procedure central to Roberts Parliamentary Rules of Order. It is often asserted that a chairman (or sub-committee) can manipulate the agenda so as to ensure the choice of an alternative which is in his (or its) interest. However, Miller and McKelvey showed that the set of sophisticated equilibrium outcomes corresponding to voting by successive elimination must lie in the Uncovered Set; and Banks (1985) provided a full characterization of this set of outcomes, which is the Banks Set. Thus, the Banks Set puts some bounds on the monopoly power of an agenda setter in the context of amendment agendas.
4
The uncovered and Banks Sets have been investigated extensively in the case where the set of alternatives is nite and voters have no a priori structure to their preferences, and so some properties of these sets are now well-known.
5 However, the explicit computation of these sets is not easy, particularly when the feasible set of alternatives is some subset of multi-dimensional Euclidean space and one might expect some natural structure to voters' preferences. The only real analysis that has made any progress on that issue is in the case of purely distributive politics, where Epstein(1998) and Laslier and Picard(2002) have shown that the Uncovered Set is the entire set of alternatives; 6 and recent papers by Penn (2002) 2 Miller (1980) had already shown that under a variety of institutional settings, game theoretic behavior by participants leads to outcomes in the Uncovered Set when the set of alternatives is nite.
3 On this aspect, see also Banks, Duggan and Le Breton (2002) . 4 Miller, Grofman, and Feld (1990a), (1990b) argue that the interest for studying the Banks Set goes beyond this. 5 See Laslier (1997) for a detailed description of this area of research. 6 See also McKelvey (1986) , Banks, et al (2003) , Cox(1987 ), De Donder (2000 , Feld, et al (1987), Fey and Dutta, Jackson, and who show that speci c equilibrium notions of agenda formation can lead to some pointed predictions in some circumstances. This paper furthers our understanding of the structure of the behavior of majority rule in spatial settings in two ways. The rst is that we identify a broad class of social choice problems that includes many situations that have been analyzed separately in the literature. The common feature of these problems is that an alternative is a feasible allocation of a given budget across nitely many uses or projects. These projects could correspond to individuals if we model private transfers in a distributive politics environment, or to districts or regions or di erent types of public expenditures in the context of pork barrel politics and nancing of local public goods (Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey (1987) , Lockwood (2002) ). Other budget allocation problems covered by our framework include the mixed setting where some private projects compete with a global public project as in Lizzeri and Persico (2001) . Our key assumption is that voters' preferences are linear; that is, indi erence contour sets are parallel hyperplanes. While a special case of the spatial model, this is a rich setting that to the best of our knowledge has never been investigated in any generality before. Our second contribution is to provide some (partial) characterizations of the uncovered, Banks, and Top Cycle sets in this setting, in the context of some important special cases. In particular, we examine in some detail the case where each voter views each project as either being good or bad.
In the next section, we introduce and illustrate the linear setting and the main concepts which are used in this paper. In section 3, we introduce the main majoritarian sets which are examined in this paper. Then, in section 4-7, we focus on the special case where there are three projects and three voters. In section 4, we present the simple geometry of the majority relation in the linear setting. We show that the necessary and su cient condition for the existence of a Condorcet winner in this setting is less stringent than the well-known condition of Plott (1967) . We also o er a direct simple proof of McKelvey's chaos theorem on the Top Cycle. Then, we calculate explicitly the Uncovered Set for many important linear settings. We also calculate or describe with some accuracy the Banks Set to show how much it di ers from the Uncovered Set. We conclude in section 8 with a discussion of the general case.
(2003), Hartley and Kilgour (1987) , Koehler(1990) .
A Model of Budget Allocation where Voters have Linear Preferences Alternatives
The set of alternatives X consists of the set of feasible allocations of a given budget, denoted by M , among K distinct possible uses. The uses may be thought of, depending upon the context, as being districts, regions, individuals, public projects or other criteria. Generic elements of X are denoted x, y, and z, and are K-dimensional vectors.
If money is assumed to be perfectly divisible, then the set X is in nite. In this case, X is the simplex
When M = 1, the set of social alternatives could be alternatively interpreted as the set of lotteries over an unstructured nite set of choices. If, instead, money can only be divided into discrete units, with say 1 being the smallest unit of money, then the set X is nite. It is then de ned as 7 ( x 2 f0; 1; : : : ; M g K :
We shall alternate between the use of these two settings. While the in nitely divisible setting provides some technical advantages, we stick with the nite world in situations where we analyze the Banks Set, as an uncontroversial de nition for the Banks Set has not been given for the case where X is in nite. We shall discuss the limit as the units become small (M becomes large), and this provides some predictions for the in nite case.
This also gives us some feel for the importance of divisibilities, as we shall see that at least in some cases the Banks Set changes as the units become relatively small, and the limit may have di erent features from situations with substantial indivisibilities.
We assume that M 4 in the indivisible setting, as the case where M 3 is an easily analyzed special case where the geometry of the problem degenerates.
Voters and Preferences
The committee or society of voters is described by the nite set N = f1; :::; N g. Voter i has preferences over the set of alternatives represented as follows. There exists a vector u i 2 IR K such that the utility to i of an alternative x is simply u i x. Thus, i prefers 7 We presume that the entire budget is allocated. This is in line with voters viewing at least one of the projects as not being objectionable.
an alternative x to an alternative y if and only if
Thus, u k i denotes i's marginal valuation for project k. So, preferences are completely described by the matrix u (u 1 ; ::::; u N ) 2 IR N K .
The linearity of indi erence is obviously special; but, as we now illustrate, it is general enough to cover a large family of interesting problems. The conventional interpretation of this problem is that an alternative is a division of the amount M among the N voters, who are assumed to derive utility exclusively from the amount they receive, the larger the better. A second interpretation views the K dimensions as K public projects in competition and assuming that each voter cares exclusively about the amount allocated to a speci c project, justifying the terminology \private projects" even if the projects have the features of public projects.
Example 2 Goods and Bads
Consider a world where each dimension is viewed by a voter as either a \good" or a \bad" project. Goods are equivalent in the voter's view, as are bads. To normalize things, goods have a marginal value of 1 and bads have a marginal value of 0. So each u i is a vector of 0's and 1's.
A special case of this is the divide the dollar setting described in Example 1, where each player has a di erent dimension that is a good, and only one dimension, and where the number of dimensions is the number of voters K = N . Another special case is the private and public good example (Example 3, below), in the case where b = 1. More generally, the goods and bads model is one where K might di er from N , several voters might view any particular dimension as good, and players might consider several dimensions to be \goods."
Example 3 Private Projects versus a Public Project
This example, inspired by Lizzeri and Persico (2001) , is a setting mixing the divide the dollar setting (Example 1) with an extra public project that is a pure public good. Here voters are bargaining between allocating resources to a common public good, and payments directly to the voters themselves. In particular, K = N + 1 and
where b is a positive parameter describing the common willingness to pay of each voter for the public project.
Example 4 Choice Between Public Projects
Consider a society allocating resources to any of a list of projects, which may have private and/or public components. In this case, there are no speci c restrictions on the matrix u. The K dimensions are interpreted as K di erent potentially projects that are in competition for funding. The allocation x k de nes the scale of operation of project k (variations in costs can be incorporated into the marginal utilities). Certainly, voter i would like to see all the budget allocated to his or her \favorite projects" (projects k such that u
However, unlike the goods and the bads model, an agent is not systematically indi erent between projects that are identical in their allocation to the agent's most preferred projects. When K = N , and the K dimensions are interpreted as districts or states in a federation or regions in a country, this model describes pork barrel politics with some form of externalities across projects. Suppose that region i derives a bene t equal to x i from project i operated at the scale x i , but also derives some bene ts from projects implemented in other regions. The bene ts resulting from these other projects are less important, the more \dis-tant" is the region (where distance might or might not be a physical measure). Precisely, u
Knowledge of the intensity of the externality and the pattern describing the geographical network, is essential for understanding the voting behavior. 
Example 5 Criteria
When bargaining over the split of a budget, it is often the case that the discussion takes place on various criteria that might be used to allocate the budget instead of directly in terms of the allocation itself.
9 For instance, consider a university deciding on how to allocate a budget among a set of departments. The decision might be based on a whole set of criteria including quality of research and teaching measured by various indicators, numbers of students, numbers of researchers, etc. Let K be the number of such criteria. With respect to these criteria, voter i (say department i) is described by the vector i = ( Here, an alternative x is a decision on the relative weight of each criterion in allocating the budget. Given an x the allocation of the budget is such that voter (department) i receives
For instance, if x 2 = 1=3, then in the university example 1/3 of the budget will be allocated based on the number of students that a department has. There,
would measure the fraction of all students that a given department has.
Presuming that voter i prefers to be allocated as much of the budget as possible, we end up with preferences for voter i described by
for each k.
Majority Voting and Tournaments
Let us now discuss how we model the choice of alternatives made by voters. The strict majority preference induced by a pro le u of preferences is denoted by T (u) and de ned over X as follows.
xT (u)y , # fi 2 N : u i x > u i yg > # fi 2 N : u i y > u i xg 9 We thank Salvador Barbera for having suggested this problem.
If N is odd and individual preferences are strict, then T = T (u) is complete.
10 Otherwise, ties may occur and this results in some freedom in how one de nes the sets and procedures that we examine next. For the following de nitions, T may be an arbitrary asymmetric (and possibly incomplete) binary relation.
Condorcet Winners
An alternative x is a Condorcet winner if :
xT y for all y 2 Xn fxg :
An alternative x is a weak Condorcet winner if :
Let W C(T ) denote the set of weak Condorcet winners associated with T .
In the case where T is complete, the two de nitions coincide. In fact, it is easy to see that whenever there is a Condorcet winner then that alternative must also be the unique weak Condorcet winner. However, in cases where T is incomplete it is possible for there to exist many weak Condorcet winners, in which case there is no Condorcet winner.
The Top Cycle
As the majority preference is not necessarily transitive, it can have cycles. A prominent cycle that we refer to in the sequel is the Top Cycle associated with T .
Let a weak T -chain between alternatives x and y be a sequence of alternatives x 1 ; : : : ; x k such that x 1 = x, x k = y, and not x j+1 T x j for each j = 1; : : : ; k 1.
The Top Cycle of T , denoted by T C(T ) is the set
11
T C(T ) = fx j 8y 2 X; 9 a weak T-chain between x and yg Thus, the Top Cycle is the set of alternatives that can reach any alternative in X via some weak T -chain.
The Uncovered Set
10 A binary relation which is asymmetric and complete is called a tournament. See Laslier (1997) for an illuminating account of the principal results in the vast literature on tournaments and majority voting.
11 When the majority preference is not complete, there are various possible de nitions of the Top Cycle (see Schwartz (1972) and Duggan and Le Breton (2001) ). All of these de nitions coincide with the de nition of T C considered in this paper when the majority preference is complete.
The Uncovered Set of T , denoted U C(T ), is the set of maximal elements of the covering relation C(T ) de ned over X. De ning C(T ) by xC(T )y if and only if xT y and for all z 2 X : yT z implies xT z; U C(T ) = fx j not yC(T )x8y 2 Xg:
Again, it should be pointed out that when T is not complete, there are several possible of the Uncovered Set. The de nition above, which is the most relevant for our subsequent analysis of the Banks Set, corresponds to U C d in Banks and Bordes (1988) , to F d in Bordes (1983) and to Miller's subset in Bordes, Le Breton and Salles (1992) . It does not correspond to the de nition of the Uncovered Set which is found in Le Breton (2002, 2003) , Dutta and Laslier (1999) and McKelvey (1986) . There, the Uncovered Set is de ned as the set of maximal elements of the partial order C(T ) de ned over X by xC(T )y i xT y and for all z 2 X : [yT z implies xT z] and [zT x implies zT y]
Since C(T ) is a subrelation of C(T ), the Uncovered Set that we focus on in this paper U C(T ) is a subset of this other Uncovered Set U C(T ).
Amendment Agendas and Voting by Successive Elimination
A prominent procedure that selects a single allocation out of the feasible set X is that based on amendment agendas, as central to Roberts Parliamentary Rules of Order. This procedure, is also often referred to as voting by successive elimination in the literature, and is de ned as follows.
Consider an ordering of the nite set of alternatives X and let = (x 1 ; : : : ; x L ) where L denotes the number of alternatives in X. A vote is rst taken to eliminate either x M or x M 1 . The`winning' alternative from the rst round is compared to x M 2 , and a vote is taken to eliminate either surviving alternative from the rst vote or x M 2 , and so on. After (M 1) comparisons, the last surviving alternative is declared to be the voting outcome.
At each stage, the elimination of one alternative is according to majority voting, or more generally according to the binary relation T . This is well-speci ed when T is complete. In cases where there are ties under the majority preference relation, or T is incomplete, the voting procedure needs to be more completely speci ed. We do so as follows. At each stage allow individuals to vote for one of the two alternatives or to abstain (in the case where they are indi erent). In case of a tie in the voting between alternatives x l and x l 0 , x l is elected if and only if x l comes before x l 0 in the ordering of voting; that is, l < l 0 . This favors alternatives proposed earlier in the agenda under ties, which is a natural way to break ties given that they have not already been broken under T . In order to determine the eventual voting outcome, it is also necessary to describe how voters act. We consider the case where they vote strategically at each stage, and so focus on the sophisticated voting outcome of this binary voting procedure.
12 This is the outcome under the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies that has been well-studied. As demonstrated by Shepsle and Weingast (1984) , 13 the sophisticated outcome induced by the ordering , denoted S( ; T ); is equal to w L which is the last element of the nite sequence described by the following algorithm:
x l if x l T w l 0 for all l 0 < l; and
The Banks Set
The Banks Set (Banks (1985)), denoted B(T ), is the subset of alternatives which are sophisticated outcomes for at least one ordering of X. Formally,
where denotes the set of permutations of X.
Let a T -chain between alternatives x and y be a sequence of alternatives x 1 ; : : : ; x k such that x 1 = x, x k = y, and x j T x j+1 for each j = 1; : : : ; k 1.
Given an alternative x 2 X, an x-chain of T is a chain H with x 2 H such that xT y for all y 2 H. The set of all x-chains is denoted H(x; T ).
Thus, an x-chain is a chain where x beats all the other alternatives in the chain according to T .
The characterization provided by Banks (1985) , stated to accommodate the possible incompleteness, can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 (Banks (1985) ) B(T ) = fx j 9H 2 H(x; T ) s:t: 8y = 2 H 9z 2 H s:t: not yT zg:
Thus, Banks showed that the outcomes found by varying the ordering (for a xed tournament) of the amendment agenda when voting by successive elimination correspond to the endpoints of chains, where the chains are such that any alternative not included in the chain is beaten by something in the chain. The intuition behind the characterization is that the alternatives in the chain are those who temporarily \win" at some stage in the voting (the w k 's in the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm), and the remaining alternatives are those who are eliminated at their stages.
The following variation on well-known inclusions is helpful in what follows.
The rst inclusion is easily seen by noting that any weak Condorcet winner forms a maximal T -chain. This means that if the ordering is such that this weak Condorcet winner appears rst in the order, then it will be the outcome of the amendment agenda, as no other alternative beats it. The second inclusion appears as theorem 4.1 in Banks and Bordes (1988) . The third inclusion follows easily from the de nitions.
In what follows we use the notation W C(u); B(u); U C(u); T C(u) to denote the sets
In the following sections, we examine the simplest framework for which the class of allocation problems described in the preceding section is not degenerate. If K = 2 or N = 2, there is always at least one weak Condorcet winner and all sets coincide with the set of weak Condorcet winners. When K 3 and N 3, the set of (weak) Condorcet winners is sometimes empty or some set of points that is not a singleton and not the whole set, and the determination of T C, U C, and B becomes more challenging and interesting as we have a true multidimensional problem. Thus, in what follows we restrict attention to the case of K = N = 3.
The Simple Geometry of the Majority Relation and the Top Cycle
In this section, we consider the continuous version of X and assume, without loss of generality, that M = 1. Under the assumption that K = N = 3, we are in position to use the simple geometry of the triangle to support our formal arguments. Given these dimensionality assumptions,
that is, X is the triangle represented on Figure 1 . The three vertices of the triangle are denoted e 1 ; e 2 and e 3 .
Insert Figure 1 about here
Given u 2 u N and x 2 X, let U (u; x) be the set of alternatives that are considered strictly superior to x by a majority, the so-called win set of x and by L(u; x) the set of alternatives that are considered strictly inferior to x by a majority of voters. When there is no Condorcet winner, these two sets are the union of three simple sets as pictured in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 about here
The following simple consequences of the linearity assumption on preferences will be very useful in the sequel.
(c) An immediate consequence of (a) is that if U (x; u) 6 = ;, then U (u; x) intersects the boundary of X; a similar observation applies to L(u; x).
(d) We deduce from (b) that if x majority dominates y, then any point belonging to the line segment joining x and y majority dominates any other point of the segment which is farther away from x.
In the rest of this section, we rule out preference pro les which either o er little interest or will be examined in some subsequent sections. In particular, we assume that each voter has a unique ideal point. It is straightforward to see that the linearity assumption implies that this ideal point is necessarily a vertex of the triangle; i.e., the ideal point must be one of e 1 ; e 2 or e 3 . We also assume that the three ideal points are all di erent, as otherwise at least two voters have the same ideal point, which is then the unique Condorcet winner. Without loss of generality, let e i be the ideal point of voter i for all i = 1; 2; 3: Finally, we limit our attention to the generic case where a given voter is never indi erent between the ideal points of the two other voters. A pro le of preferences u displaying these features is described by matrix with three degrees of freedom. A pro le of preferences is completely described by a vector u (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ) 2 (0; 1) 3 where v i denotes the intensity of the preference of voter i for his second best choice among the vertices. Within this class of linear preference pro les, two situations may appear:
(1) None of the vertices dominates the two other vertices. Up to a permutation of voters' labels, a pro le of preferences u in this category is described by a matrix
(2) One of the vertices majority dominates the two other vertices. When this happens, we call such a vertex a vertex Condorcet winner as it would be the obvious winner if competition was limited to the nite set of vertices. Up to a permutation of voters' labels, a pro le of preferences u in this category is described by a matrix
We rst examine the conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists.
Proposition 2 Let u (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ) 2 (0; 1) 3 be a pro le of preferences as described in (1) and (2) above. x is a Condorcet winner for u, if and only if it is a vertex and u falls in category (2) and satis es v 2 + v 3 1 (where up to a permutation of labels, vertex e 1 is the winner).
Proposition 2 departs in a fundamental way from Plott's well-known necessary and sufcient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner in the spatial model. His result asserts that for some alternative x to be a Condorcet winner, it has to be that x is the ideal point of some voter i and for any other voter j, there exists a voter k such that the normalized gradients of the utility functions of j and k evaluated in x are exactly opposite. Since such symmetry conditions are not robust to perturbations of preferences, a corollary of Plott's result is that Condorcet winners do not exist generically. It is often forgotten that this applies only if x is in the interior or relative interior of the feasible set, which is vacuously true if X is the entire Euclidean space. If, instead, like here, X is a compact convex subset of the Euclidean space, then Plott's conditions do not apply to alternatives on the boundary. This applies systematically in our linear setting, since we just demonstrated that Condorcet winners, when they exist, are on the boundary. The necessary and su cient condition stated in Proposition 2 is robust to perturbations.
Let us make a nal comment on the existence of Condorcet winners. The linear setting is a natural generalization of the nite setting and will be at least as complicated as the nite setting in that the majority tournament limited to the set of vertices can take any form. But the linear setting is richer in that a vertex doing well when matched exclusively against the other vertices may be defeated by a majority when compromises are introduced. Suppose u displays the pattern The following proposition provides a complete description of T C(u) when u (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ) 2 (0; 1) 3 is a pro le of preferences as described above.
Proposition 3 Let u be a pro le of preferences as described in (1) or (2) above. Then, either there is a Condorcet winner, or T C(u) = X, or T C(u) = Xn fe i g for some i.
Proposition 3 is a version of McKelvey's chaos theorem in our linear setting. The proof o ered in the appendix shows how a cycle connecting any two alternatives is constructed, and the problems raised by the existence of a boundary are addressed. In contrast to the conditions leading to the existence of a Condorcet winner, the boundary does not have much impact here, as the only departure from total chaos is the exclusion of a Condorcet loser, when there is one.
The Goods and Bads Model
In this section, we return to the discrete version of the problem, still keeping with N = K = 3. We focus on the goods and bads model of example 2 and characterize all of the sets, including the Banks and Uncovered Sets.
Let us rst start with the analysis of a prominent case that falls in the goods and bads model: that of the divide the dollar model.
Proposition 4 Consider the divide the dollar model of Example 1. The set of weak Condorcet winners is empty, the Top Cycle is the whole set of alternatives, and the Uncovered Set is the set of alternatives excluding the vertices. The Banks Set includes every x 2 X such that
, for some i and distinct j, k . Thus, the size of the Banks Set converges to the size of the set of alternatives as the grid becomes ner
= 1). However, the Banks Set is a strict subset of the Uncovered Set for any M > 5; as (M 1; 1; 0) and permutations of these points are not in the Banks Set.
15
Proposition 4 provides a di erent view of the Banks Set than what is previously known. While in some nite settings with arbitrary preferences, one can nd examples where the Banks Set is a strict subset of the Uncovered Set (see Banks (1985) ), it was not known whether this was true in more naturally structured environments. Indeed, Penn (2003) shows that in an in nitely divisible version of a divide the dollar game with three players, the Banks Set and Uncovered Set coincide.
16 Here, in contrast, the Banks Set makes a selection from the Uncovered Set. As the indivisibilities disappear, the sets converge to each other, with the Banks Set always remaining a strict subset of the Uncovered Set.
Let us now return to the more general analysis of the goods and bads model, where players may agree on which dimensions are goods, and may like several dimensions.
Let
Note that s 2 f0; 1; : : : ; 9g, and s k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. Thus, s k is the strength of the support for dimension k. The analysis of the various sets now depends on the relative strengths of the dimensions.
15 For larger M , one can also check that (M 2; 2; 0) and (M 2; 1; 1) (and permutations) are not in the Banks Set, and so forth; but the proofs become increasingly tedious as the number of chains to be ruled out grow as we move away from the vertices. 16 Penn's de nition of the Banks Set in in nite settings is directly in terms of maximal chains rather than in terms of an agenda, and her tie-breaking rule is di erent from ours. It is not clear that there is an unambiguously appealing de nition of the Banks Set in the in nite setting, as without some modi cations of tie-breaking there does not exist any maximal chains. (1) If one dimension dominates the others (s 1 > s 2 ), then the vertex corresponding to that dimension is a Condorcet winner and all the sets coincide (T C(u) = U C(u) = B(u) = W C(u) = f(M; 0; 0)g).
(2) If there are two dimensions that have the same strength and dominate the third (s 1 = s 2 > s 3 ), then there is no Condorcet winner and the sets include all points that allocate only to the rst two dimensions (T C(u) = U C(u) = B(u) = W C(u) = fx j x 3 = 0g).
(3) In the case where the strength of support for the three dimensions is identical (
(3a) If some voter is completely indi erent, then no alternative beats any other, and so Proposition 5 states that the analysis of the goods and bads model breaks into ve cases, basically depending on how much agreement there is among the voters as to which dimensions are goods. When there is enough agreement (as in (1) or (2)), then the predictions are narrow, while when there is signi cant disagreement (as in (3a) (3b) and (3c)) then many voting cycles appear and the sets are nearer to the entire space. Interestingly, the only situation where something falls in between is in the divide the dollar game with smaller M (substantial indivisibilities) where the Banks Set is narrower than the Uncovered Set and Top Cycle.
More speci cally, in the rst case, there is some dimension that receives more support than any other, and then giving the full budget to this dimension is a Condorcet winner. In the second case, there are two dimensions that are viewed as goods by an equal number of voters and the third dimension is viewed as a good by a lesser number. Here, the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set of alternatives that give only to the two dimensions with broader support. In the third, fourth, and fth cases, all of the dimensions have equal support. However, they behave quite di erently. In the third case, no alternative beats any other, as the two voters who are not indi erent completely disagree on the goods and bads, and so all sets are the whole space. In the fourth case, the three vertices form the set of Weak Condorcet winners. The Top Cycle is the whole set X, while the Banks and Uncovered Sets are almost the entire set X. The fth case refers to the divide the dollar game, as already discussed.
Beyond the Goods and Bads Model.
We have o ered a complete description of W C(u), T C(u) and U C(u), and some bounds on the description of B(u), for the goods and bad model,. In this section, we return to the more general linear model. In Section 4, we analyzed that model in terms of understanding the Top Cycle. We now return to that analysis to see what we can say about the Uncovered Set.
Precisely, we focus on the generic case where there is not a Condorcet winner and the pro le of preferences is described by the pattern In such a case, T C(u) rules out the Condorcet loser e 3 , but none of the points arbitrarily close to e 3 . The following proposition demonstrates that there is a neighborhood of e 3 which is outside U C(u). The proof technique is based on the following simple but useful lemma which follows immediately from the de nition of covering (C(T )).
Lemma 2 x 2 U C(u) if and only if for all y 2 Y either not yT x or there exists z 2 X such that xT z and not yT z.
This lemma states a version of the two-step principle (a terminology due to Miller and McKelvey) . Indeed, the lemma states that to be in the Uncovered Set an alternative x must weakly majority dominate any other alternative in either one step or two steps; and if there are two steps then the rst component of the weak T -chain must be strict. Let L 2 (x) be the set (XnU (u; x)) [ ([ y2L(u;x) (XnU (u; y))). 17 The lemma asserts that x 2 U C(u) if and only if L 2 (x) = X.
Proposition 6 Let u be as discussed above and x = (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 X. Then, x 2 U C(u) if and only if
It is interesting to note that the condition in Proposition 6 does not involve v 3 . If v 1 = v 2 v, then the condition in the Proposition is simply that :
Obviously, from Proposition 6 it follows that the Uncovered Set rules out many points around e 3 . This is a rst step in an exploration of U C(u). This provides the interesting conclusion that the Uncovered Set is a subset of the space of alternatives that depends in interesting ways on the utility pro le. Likely, a similar analysis can be conducted in the case where there is no vertex Condorcet winner.
The Mixed Private versus Public Goods Model
In this nal section, we investigate the mixed private versus public goods model de ned as Example 3. In this model, a pro le of preferences is identi ed by the single positive parameter b describing the common willingness to pay of each voter for the public project. To emphasize this speci city, we use the notation W C(b), T C(b) and U C(b) instead of W C(u), T C(u) and U C(u). The following proposition describes the dependence of the three sets 18 upon the parameter b.
Proposition 7 Consider the mixed private versus public goods model from Example 3.
(1) If the bene t from the public good is large (b > 1 2 ), then allocating the entire budget to the public good is a Condorcet Winner (and thus, W C(b) = U C(b) = T C(b) = (0; 0; 0; M ) ).
(2) If the bene t from the public good is intermediate (
), then there are no weak Condorcet winners, the Top Cycle is the whole set of alternatives, and the Uncovered Set is the set of alternatives such that at most two voters get a positive amount of the private good and no voter gets the entire supply of the private good (U C(b) = n x 2 X : x i = 0 for at least one i 2 f1; 2; 3g an 17 The notation L 2 is justi ed by the fact that when T is a tournament, L 2 (x) = L(u; x) [([ y2L(u;x) L(u; y)). 18 We have not calculated the Banks Set in this model. Proposition 7 demonstrates that the presence of the public project has an impact on the distributive politics component of the budget allocation. If the bene t from the public good is su cient, then it swamps the private allocation, as in (1). If it is too small, then the problem becomes similar to the divide the dollar game, as in (3). In the middle case, we see some interesting impact of the public good. One voter among the three should derive his payo exclusively from public consumption. This is due to the fact that when b > 1 3
, the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson rst order optimality condition rules out any interior allocation. Since the Uncovered Set is a subset of the Pareto set, this provides an upper bound. We prove that, in fact, the two sets coincide.
Concluding Remarks and Higher Dimensions
We have shown that it is possible to make predictions about the nature of voting equilibria under majoritarian rule that are not too sensitive to speci c institutional details, even in multi-dimensional policy space. We did this by analyzing budget allocation problems where voters' preferences are linear.
Section 4 describes the geometric structure of the Top Cycle set. Proposition 2 showed that if there is a Condorcet winner, then it must be a vertex. We also found that the conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists extend Plott's analysis because they are applicable even when a Condorcet winner lies on the boundary of the feasible set -which is absent from his analysis. Having a boundary on the problem provides a di erent perspective than one gets from Plott's analysis, and the possibility of a Condorcet winner is no longer so extreme. Proposition 3 is the counterpart of Mckelvey's chaos theorems, and shows that if a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the Top Cycle set is virtually the entire set -at most it excludes the three vertices. So, while we still come to the conclusion that the Top Cycle is either a single point or the whole space, the conditions under which it is a single point are no longer so extreme.
We went on to consider the goods and bads model, where voters view each dimension as either a good or a bad. Proposition 5 demonstrates that there are cases where the Banks Set and Uncovered Sets are strict subsets of the feasible set, even in situations where no Condorcet winner exists. The Banks Set is generally a strict subset of the Uncovered Set, but the di erence between the two sets disappears as the divisibility of the budget becomes ner.
In section 6, we returned to the more general linear preference framework of section 4, but restrict attention to the analysis of preference pro les which give rise to a vertex Condorcet winner. We characterize the Uncovered Set and show that it excludes a neighborhood of points close to the vertex Condorcet loser. This provides an interesting setting in which the Uncovered Set makes pointed predictions about the outcome of any majority rule based collective decision.
Finally, section 7 looks at the \mixed" public and private goods model (Example 3). Not surprisingly, voters' common willingness to pay for the public good turns out to be the crucial parameter in this model. If this willingness to pay is very high, then the entire budget will be spent in production of the public good under majoritarian rule. Conversely, if the willingness to pay is low, then the Uncovered Set excludes production of the public good. The interesting case is when the common willingness to pay takes on an intermediate value, and then the Uncovered Set predicts that at least one voter must be excluded from consumption of the private good.
The bulk of our analysis was in the special case where there are three projects and three voters, as that case is still tractable and yet introduces the full force of multi-dimensionality. Certainly, it is worthwhile to explore beyond this. While the extension to more than three projects and/or three voters does not raise conceptual di culties, it is obviously much trickier. One reason is that the linear model is at least as di cult as the nite model and therefore moving to larger K complicates the combinatorics of the problem, as we know from the theory of majority tournaments. We have listed below several directions of investigation that seem promising to explore as a continuation of the analysis performed here.
What happens to the goods and bads model in higher dimensions? The following conjecture might be considered.
Conjecture: Consider the goods and bads model, and a case where there is some dimension k that a strict majority of agents view as a good. Let J be the set of agents who think k is a good and let A = fk 0 : such that u k 0 i = 1 for some i 2 Jg: If x 2 U C(u) and`= 2 A, then x`< K.
It seems that Proposition 2 generalizes to higher dimensions. A Condorcet winner will have to be a vertex. What conditions ensure that this vertex Condorcet is a Condorcet winner? Using Farkas' Lemma, it seems that a complete characterization of preference pro les for which this holds is possible! Once again, this will depart from Plott's symmetry conditions.
It seems that we can also generalize Proposition 3 to higher dimensions, as follows. De ne the vertex Top Cycle, denoted V T C(u), to be the subset of vertices that are in the Top Cycle of the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices and the vertex bottom cycle, denoted V BC(u), to be the subset of vertices that are in the bottom cycle of the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices. We conjecture that
This implies that if a vertex is in the vertex top cycle, then it is in the Top Cycle, but the converse does not hold, as we know already from the case where K = N = 3.
The computation of the Uncovered Set does not seem out of reach either. One preliminary question we may ask could be the following. De ne the Vertex Uncovered Set to be the subset of vertices which are in the Uncovered Set of the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices. Is it true that a vertex is in the Vertex Uncovered Set must also be in the Uncovered Set? We know that the converse does not hold from Proposition 4.
Finally, a detailed exploration of Example 3 would be valuable. It is straightforward to check that if there is a Condorcet winner, it must give the whole allocation to the public project. Furthermore, this project is a Condorcet winner if and only if
The following conjecture, extending Proposition 7, could be considered. Conjecture: Consider the private versus public goods model.
, then U C(b) = fx 2 X : x i = 0 for at least N M + 1 voters g.
Note that the rst assertion is true from an analysis of the Pareto set. Only the second assertion remains to be proved.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let x be a Condorcet winner for u. We rst show that x must be on the boundary of the triangle. Assume to the contrary that x is in the interior of X. Then, for all i; j 2 N , the indi erence lines of voters i and j passing through x must be identical, as otherwise, there would exist y in the neighborhood of x such that u i y > u i x and u j y > u j x, contradicting our assumption that x is a Condorcet winner. This implies that the slopes of the indi erence lines of voters i and j through x are the same, so that v i v j = 1. This cannot be, as there is no solution (v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ) 2 (0; 1) 3 to the system of equations
So we have shown that a Condorcet winner must be on the boundary of X. Next, we show that a Condorcet winner must be a vertex. We know from above that a Condorcet winner x can be written as x = e i + (1 )e j for some 0 < < 1. Then, either u k e i > u k e j , in which case e i majority dominates e j via the coalition fi; kg; or, u k e i < u k e j , in which case e j majority dominates e i via the coalition fj; kg. Therefore, either = 0 or = 1, and the Condorcet winner must be a vertex. We complete the proof by showing that (2) must apply and that v j + v k 1 for some j and k. Without loss of generality, let x = e 1 . Then, u must fall in (2) and it must be that
Indeed, since e 1 majority dominates e 2 and e 3 , then either e 3 is the worst choice for 1 and 2 or e 2 is the worst choice for 1 and 3. Without loss of generality, consider the rst case.
For e 1 to be Condorcet winner it is necessary and su cient that there not exist (y 1 ; y 2 ) 2 X such that v 2 y 1 + y 2 > v 2 and (v 3 1)y 1 y 2 > v 3 1:
It is straightforward to check that this system of inequalities is consistent with (y 1 ; y 2 ) 2 X if and only if v 2 + v 3 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3 : Assume that there is no Condorcet winner. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: There is no vertex Condorcet winner. In this case, up to a permutation, e 1 T (u)e 2 T (u)e 3 T (u)e 1 and from (d) above, the cycle extends to the whole boundary of X: for any two points z and w on the boundary there is a weak T -chain between z and w. Now take x and y in X. Since there is no Condorcet winner, we deduce from (c) above that there exist z and w on the boundary of X such that xT (u)z and wT (u)y: The existence of a weak T -chain between x and y follows from the juxtaposition of the three weak T -chains. This proves that T C(u) = X. above, we deduce that e 1 T (u)e 2 T (u)zT (u)e 1 and from (d) above the cycle extends to the entire boundary of the triangle with vertices e 1 ; e 2 and z, as illustrated in Figure 5 .
Insert Figure 5 x 6 = e 3 . The idea is to construct a weak T -chain starting from x and ending in h belonging to the smaller triangle with vertices e 1 ; e 2 and z; once there, we just demonstrated that you can anywhere else on the boundary of X. The construction goes as follows. First consider f 2 [z; e 3 ] and let g be the intersection of [e 1 ; e 3 ] with the indi erence line of voter 2 passing through f . Given the slopes of the indi erence line of voters 2 and 3, it is easy to see that this point is well de ned and that u 3 g > u 3 f . Then, de ne h as being the intersection of the indi erence line of voter 3 with either [z; e 1 ] or [z; e 3 ]. Given the slopes of the indi erence lines of voters 1 and 3, it is easy to see that this point is well de ned and that u 1 h > u 1 g. We have obtained the short weak T -chain f T (u)gT (u)h. This is illustrated in Figure 6 .
Insert Figure 6 about here After a nite number of steps, we will obtain a point in [z; e 1 ]. This is illustrated in Figure   7 .
Insert Figure 7 about here
The case where f 2 [e 1 ; e 3 ] follows from (a) above, since f = e 1 + (1 )e 3 for some 2 ]0; 1[ and e 1 T (u)w for all w 2 ]z; e 3 [, we deduce that f T (u) w+(1 )e 3 . The connection involving points in the interior of X is done as in case 1. This completes the proof of the claim that T C(u) = Xn fe 3 g.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, note that yT x implies that y exceeds x on exactly two dimensions. From this it is clear that there are no weak Condorcet winners, as for any alternative there exists some other alternative that gives more to two of the dimensions (given that M 4).
Next, let us check that the Uncovered Set is the set of all points less the vertices. Consider x = (u; v; w) that is defeated by some y = (a; b; c). Without loss of generality, let a > u, b > v, and c w 2. Consider z = (M c 1; 0; c + 1). Here, provided v > 0, x beats z and yet z beats y. Thus, y cannot cover x. This implies that the only covered points could be the vertices. Indeed, the vertices never beat any point, and are beaten by any interior point, and so are covered.
To verify that the Top Cycle is X, we only need to check that the vertices are in the Top Cycle, as the other alternatives are all uncovered. We need to check that from any vertex, say x = (M; 0; 0), and any other alternative y there is a weak T -chain. If y has a 0 in either of the last two dimensions, then x and y are non-comparable, and so there is a weak T -chain directly. Thus consider any alternative y = (u; v; w), where v > 0 and w > 0. Let z = (u + 1; v + w 1; 0). Then x is non-comparable to z and z defeats y, so there is a weak T -chain from x to y. This completes the proof of the Top Cycle.
The claims about the Banks Set are established as follows. Let us identify a maximal T -chain with x = (u; v; w), where u v w, at the end.
Consider the case where u > v + w. (u; v; w), (u 1; v + 2; w 1), (u 4; v + 6; w 2), : : : (u c i ; v + i + c i ; w i), : : : ... where i is the index of the step until w i hits 0, then (u c i ; v i + w; i + c i ) for the remaining steps until v + w i hits 0. Let us de ne c i , and let i be the smallest i for which u (i 2 + 3i 2)=2 v + w i: Then for i < i set 
Proof of Proposition 5:
Case (1) is easily checked directly. Let us check (2). If s 1 = s 2 = 3 > s 3 , then it must be that every voter weakly prefers any allocation x with x 3 = 0 to any allocation y with y 3 6 = 0, and some voter has a strict preference between any two such allocations. Moreover, all voters are indi erent between any two allocations that have x 3 = 0, and so the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set fx j x 3 = 0g. Since any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set, this is the Top Cycle. Also, since the set of weak Condorcet winners is a subset of the Banks Set, the claim follows from Lemma 1 noting that fx j x 3 = 0g = W C(u) B(u) U C(u) T C(u) = fx j x 3 = 0g.
If s 1 = s 2 = 2 > s 3 , then it can be checked that any allocation x with x 3 = 0 defeats any allocation y with y 3 6 = 0. [Such a y gets at most one vote versus such an x, and such an x always gets at least one vote versus such a y. For any con guration of preferences that ts in this case where such a y gets one vote, it must be that such an x gets two votes.] Also, there must be one voter who is indi erent between all allocations in fx j x 3 = 0g, while the other two agents split on it. Thus, again the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set fx j x 3 = 0g, and any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set. So the rest of the proof is as in the case above. If s 1 = s 2 = 1 > s 3 = 0, then either there is one voter who thinks both dimensions 1 and 2 are goods, and other voters are completely indi erent, or there are two voters who each like one of the two dimensions, and the other voter is indi erent between all allocations. In either situation it is clear that the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set fx j x 3 = 0g, and any allocation outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set, as in the earlier cases. Next, let us consider (3a). In this case, without loss of generality, suppose that voter 1 views dimension 1 as a good, voter 2 views dimensions 2 and 3 as goods, and voter 3 is completely indi erent. If we consider two alternatives that have the same allocation to dimension 1, then all voters are indi erent between these alternatives. If we consider two alternatives that have di erent allocations between dimension 1, then voters 1 and 2 will have opposing preferences over the alternatives. Thus, any two alternatives are non-comparable under T (u).
Next, let us consider (3b). Note that no two voters agree on which dimensions are goods. There is one voter who likes dimensions 1 and 2, one who likes 2 and 3, and one who likes 1 and 3. One key observation is that if yT (u)x in this case, it must be that y exceeds x on exactly one dimension and is less than x on the two remaining dimensions. (If it is the same on any dimension then they are non-comparable. If y exceeds x on two dimensions, then the sum of the remaining dimension together with either other dimension is greater under x, and x will win.) This results in the following observations about T (u).
(a) Any two alternatives which agree on some dimension are non-comparable to each other.
(b) Any vertex will beat any alternative that is positive on the other two dimensions.
From (a) and (b) it follows that the vertices are not beaten by any alternative, and from (b), it follows that any other alternative is beaten by some vertex. Thus the set of weak Condorcet winners is exactly the set of vertices.
Next, let us show that U C(u) = X n f(M 2; 1; 1); (1; M 2; 1); (1; 1; M 2)g X . First, we show that x = (M 2; 1; 1) is not in the Uncovered Set. Let y = (M; 0; 0). Then, yT x. Suppose not yT z. Then, from (b), either z 2 = 0 or z 3 = 0. Without loss of generality, suppose z 2 = 0. In order for x to beat z, x has to be bigger than z in just one component, and smaller than z in the other two components. Since z 2 = 0, this means that x 1 < z 1 and x 3 < z 3 . But this is not possible. So, xT z implies yT z. Hence, x is covered. Analogous arguments establish that (1; M 2; 1) and (1; 1; M 2) are covered.
Next, we show that no other element in X is covered. Each vertex forms a maximal chain as a singleton and so is in the Banks Set and thus the Uncovered Set.
Next, consider an alternative x 2 X that has two dimensions positive and the other 0. Without loss of generality, say x = (a; M a; 0) where a M a. This alternative beats (0; M 1; 1). Note also that any alternative y that has y 3 1 does not beat (0; M 1; 1) (the voter who likes the last two dimensions is at best indi erent, and the voter who likes the rst two dimensions prefers (0; M 1; 1)). Thus only alternatives with y 3 = 0 beat (0; M 1; 1). Then, it follows from (a) that forming a chain of x and (0; M 1; 1) is a maximal chain that results in x, and so x is in the Banks Set, and thus the Uncovered Set. Next, consider an interior alternative x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) 2 X . Without loss of generality, If y 2 = 0, then choose z = (x 1 + 1; 0; x 3 + x 2 1). Note that since x 2 X , x 2 2. Again, xT z, but y and z are non-comparable.
The last possibility is that y 3 = 0. Since yT x, there is i such that y
2, check that z 3 > x 3 . It follows that xT z and yT z. So, x is not covered.
Thus, we have shown that U C(u) = X , and so Lemma 1 implies that X T C(u). Now, consider x = (M 2; 1; 1). We show that there is a weak T -chain connecting x to each of the vertices. Take (M; 0; 0). Then, the weak T -chain is (x; (M 2; 0; 2); (M; 0; 0)). Weak T -chains to other vertices are obvious extensions of this weak T -chain. Similarly, there is a weak T -chain from x to any other point in X. Hence, T C(u) = X.
Next, let us identify the Banks Set. Our arguments above already show that the Banks Set includes all alternatives that are not in the interior. Consider x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) in the interior. Without loss of generality, let x 1 x 2 x 3 1, and since B(u) U C(u) = X , we know that x 2 2. Let k + be the smallest integer greater than or equal to k, and k the greatest integer smaller than or equal to k. Let us build a T -chain that ends in x and argue that it is maximal. This shows that x is in the Banks Set.
The rst element in the chain is x. The next part of the sequence are the alternatives (x 1 + 1; x that x belongs to the rst area. Then, L(x) is the union of the quadrilateral xAe 3 B and the two triangles xCD and xEF . This pattern is depicted in Figure 9 where the hatched area corresponds to L(x).
20
Insert Figure 9 about here From Lemma 2, to test if x 2 U C(u), it is enough to calculate L 2 (x). From the geometry of the problem, it is straightforward to verify that L 2 (x) is the union of the two triangles Let I (w 1 ; w 2 ) be the intersection of the lines GF and DH. Therefore, L 2 (x) = X i w 1 + w 2 < 1. The rest of the proof amounts to simple calculus. The rst coordinate of F , say f 1 , is solution of the equation
Therefore, the line F G is described by the equation
Similarly, the second coordinate of D, say d 2 , is solution of the linear equation
Therefore, the line DH is described by the equation
We deduce that
which implies the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 7:
20 Up to the exclusion of the boundaries.
(1) Let b > 1 3
, y Pareto dominates and therefore covers x. Next, suppose that x k = M for some k 2 f1; 2; 3g. Then, x is covered by (0; 0; 0; M ), as x does not defeat any alternative.
(ii) U C(b) n x 2 X : x i = 0 for at least one i 2 f1; 2; 3g and x k 6 = M for any k 2 f1; 2; 3g o . Without loss of generality, consider the case where x 3 = 0: Suppose that, contrary to the assertion, x is covered by y. Since we can take y to be uncovered, from (i) we deduce that either y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; 0; y 4 ) or y = (y 1 ; 0; y 3 ; y 4 ) or y = (0; y 2 ; y 3 ; y 4 ). Let us consider the case where x 4 6 = 0:
Case 1 : y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; 0; y 4 ). Subcase 1 : y 4 x 4 . Since yT x, we deduce that y 4 6 = x 4 and therefore y 1 > x 1 and y 2 > x 2 : It follows that (x 1 ; x 2 ; 0; x 4 )T (y 1 + y 2 ; 0; 0; y 4 ) but not [(y 1 ; y 2 ; 0; y 4 )T (y 1 + y 2 ; 0; 0; y 4 )]. This shows that y does not cover x.
Subcase 2 : y 4 > x 4 . The extra public good y 4 x 4 is nanced by voters 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, assume that voter 2 pays at least half of the cost i.e. y 2 x 2 y 4 x 4 2 . Consider the vector z (1 y 2 by 4 "; y 2 + by 4 + ; 0; 0) where " is a small positive number. Note that for " small enough, z is a feasible allocation as y 2 + by 4 < y 2 + y 4 2 < 1 since b < 1 2 . Then, for " small enough, xT z since x 4 6 = 0 while however Not [yT z]. This shows again that y does not cover x.
Case 2 : y = (y 1 ; 0; y 3 ; y 4 ). Subcase 1 : y 4 x 4 . Then, for su ciently small but positive, , we have : (x 1 ; x 2 ; 0; x 4 )T (y 1 + y 3 ; ; 0; y 4 ) but Not [(y 1 ; 0; y 3 ; y 4 )T (y 1 + y 3 ; ; 0; y 4 )]
This shows that y does not cover x. Subcase 2 : y 4 > x 4 . Clearly, 3 prefers y to x. Suppose rst that 1 also prefers y to x (and therefore that 2 prefers x to y), and consider the vector z (1 by 4 "; by 4 + "; 0; 0), where " is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ", z is a feasible allocation and xT z while, not [yT z]. If instead 1 prefers x to y, and therefore 2 prefers y to x, consider the vector z (y 2 + by 4 + "; 0; 1 y 2 by 4 "; 0), where " is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ", z is a feasible allocation and xT z since x 4 6 = 0, while not [yT z]. This again shows that y does not cover x.
Case 3 : y = (0; y 2 ; y 3 ; y 4 ). This case is similar to case 2. Consider the situation where x 4 = 0. The analysis has to be changed slightly. Case 1 : y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; 0; y 4 ). Since yT x and b < 1 2
, it must be that y 4 > 0. Furthermore, either y 1 + by 4 < x 1 or y 2 + by 4 < x 2 . Without loss of generality assume that the second inequality holds and let z (0; y 2 + by 4 + "; 1 y 2 by 4 ; 0), where " is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ", z is a feasible allocation and xT z while not [yT z].
Case 2 : y = (y 1 ; 0; y 3 ; y 4 ). Subcase 1 : y 4 = 0. Since x 1 6 = 0 and x 2 6 = 0, we deduce from Proposition 4 that y cannot cover x. Subcase 2 : y 4 > 0. Clearly, 3 prefers y to x. Suppose that 1 also prefers y to x (and therefore that 2 prefers x to y), and consider the vector z (0; by 4 + "; 1 by 4 "; 0), where " is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ", z is a feasible allocation and xT z while not [yT z]. If on the other hand, 1 prefers x to y, and therefore 2 prefers y to x, consider the vector z (y 1 + by 4 + "; 0; 1 y 1 by 4 "; 0) where " is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ", z is a feasible allocation and xT z since x 2 6 = 0 while not [yT z]. This shows again that y does not cover x.
Case 3 : y = (0; y 2 ; y 3 ; y 4 ). Similar to case 2. 21 For any A X, U C(b j A) denotes the Uncovered Set when the set of alternatives is restricted to the subset A. 22 We leave the proof of this simple claim to the reader. Note however that the reverse inclusion U C U C(P O) does not always hold i.e. while the deletion of Pareto undominated alternatives can never hurts an alternative already in the Uncovered Set, the consideration of such alternatives may help some other alternatives which would not be in otherwise ! X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X s 3 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Figure 4 A \Vertex" Condorcet Winner which is not a Condorcet Winner X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a l l l l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
